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SPACETIME ‘EMERGENCE’
NICK HUGGETT
Could spacetime be derived rather than fundamental? The question is pressing because
attempts to quantize gravity have led to theories in which (arguably) there are either no, or
only extremely thin, spacetime structures. Moreover, recent proposals for the interpretation
of quantum mechanics have suggested that 3-dimensional space may be an ‘appearance’
derived from the 3N -dimensional space in which an N -particle wavefunction lives (cross-
reference). In fact, I will largely assume a positive answer, and investigate how it could
be; in particular, I want to explicate the role of philosophy in producing a satisfactory
explanation of spacetime, providing a roadmap for philosophical engagement with quantum
gravity. First, I will explain why such a derivation can be described as ‘emergence’.
1. Why Spacetime ‘Emergence’?
Let’s specify some terms. The general framework involves a pair of theories, one less
fundamental, and one more fundamental from which it is putatively derived. For brevity,
call the former ‘fundamental’ (without implying that it is the ‘final’ theory), and the latter
‘derived’ (supposing that the putative derivation exists): ideal gas laws are derived, and
the kinetic model fundamental, in these senses.
We are interested in cases in which the derived theory is spatiotemporal, but the fun-
damental theory, in some significant sense, is not. What cases are these? The derived
theories are general relativity (GR) and quantum field theory (QFT); the former describes
curved relativistic spacetime, the latter subatomic particles in flat relativistic spacetime
(cross-references). Deriving the former means recovering solutions of the Einstein Field
Equations , while deriving the latter means recovering particle scattering predictions, in
suitable limits (so one expects corrections to these theories away from the limit). The space-
time of these theories can be referred to variously as ‘classical’, ‘relativistic’, ‘ordinary’, or
‘empirical’ (when one wants to emphasize that it is part of our best tested theories); or for
brevity simply ‘spacetime’.
The fundamental theories are proposed accounts of quantum spacetime (QS): for ex-
ample, loop quantum gravity (cross-reference), string theory (cross-reference), causal set
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theory, non-commutative geometry, and group field theory (GFT).1 Most are discussed
elsewhere in this volume, so (except for GFT, below) I will not describe them further
here (but see references in the final section). The goal is rather to explicate the general
philosophical problem of deriving spacetime, which they have in common.
There are then two aspects to understanding derived spacetime. First, the sense in which
the fundamental theory is non-spatiotemporal; what aspects of spacetime are missing?
How should we understand the structures that are present? (If spacetime is present in the
fundamental theory, the question of a derivation does not even arise.) These questions are
not the focus of this essay; answers are sketched in [Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2013]. Second,
the derivation; how is spacetime explained in terms of the fundamental structure? This
question is our focus, and we will address it in two ways: how is such a thing even possible
in principle, and how does it happen in a concrete case? (Other cases are addressed in
[Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2018].)
Before we do, suppose that we have a derivation of spacetime in terms of a fundamental
theory. Why should that situation be described as ‘emergence’? The term generally
describes a situation in which a less fundamental structure is qualitatively different from a
fundamental one in some way. Different senses then arise from different specific accounts
of qualitative difference. A particularly salient sense applies when the more fundamental
theory cannot account for the less fundamental theory at all, so that they are autonomous:
either there is no derivation (no systematic map from more to less fundamental) at all,
or for some reason the map is a mere harmonic correspondence between distinct objects.
Indeed, this sense – that the less fundamental does not supervene on the more fundamental
– has been a characteristic sense of ‘emergence’ in philosophy, at least since its revival in
the 1990s. However, it is not the only sense with currency. For instance, [Butterfield, 2011]
defends emergence as behaviour that is robust, and novel with respect to the fundamental
theory: novelty arises from the taking of limits, and his conception is logically distinct from
others in the vicinity.
Or again, in the foundations of QS, [Seiberg, 2006] uses the term to mean that space
and time ‘are not present in the fundamental formulation of the theory, but appear as
approximate macroscopic concepts’. Such a sense is unlikely to agree with the philosophical
one in specific cases, and it may or may not agree with Butterfield’s, depending on how
spacetime is recovered. Seiberg’s core case is AdS/CFT duality (cross-reference), in which
whole dimensions of space are said to be derived; formally the derivation is of the kind
Butterfield has in mind, but it is an equivalence, so there is no obvious sense in which there
is a distinction between more and less fundamental [Teh, 2013]. String theorists often have
this specific model in mind when they apply the term, but others concerned with the
foundations of QS tend to apply ‘emergence’ more generally, following Seiberg’s definition.
The idea is that spacetime structures – whether they are Aristotelian, Newtonian, Galilean,
1Some but not all of these theories, or versions of them, go under the more specific heading of ‘quantum
gravity’ (QG); I use the more general term QS here. All such theories are seen as at least stepping stones
to QG. (We will not explicitly discuss configuration space realism, though similar considerations apply. See
[Ney and Albert, 2013].)
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Einsteinian, Euclidean, or (pseudo-)Riemannian – are so essential to all previous theories
of physics that their absence is in itself a profound kind of qualitative difference.
As I said, what replaces them is discussed elsewhere (including this volume, and below),
but it will be helpful to have something concrete in mind, to underline the chasm between
a theory without spacetime and a theory with it. One might have in mind that a quantum
spacetime is nothing but a kind of discrete spacetime, as a continuous energy spectrum
might turn out to be discrete at fine discriminations. The conceptual gulf is then not so
great. But, for instance, spacetime might be replaced by a set of objects with no essential
spacetime meaning, and some structure (say that of a group – as in the case study below). A
collection of structured objects is called a ‘space’ in mathematics, but that does not mean it
is ordinary space: in the relevant cases the objects are not identified with spacetime points,
nor do they have the geometric or topological structures of space – all these things are
derived. Space truly comes from ‘nowhere’. It is not only hard, psychologically, to imagine
such a thing at first, since existing theories assume space and time as their most basic
postulates, it means a whole new understanding of nature, and spacetime’s place within it
is needed. No one has that understanding yet; the purpose of this article is toexplicate the
problems with developing it, while emphasizing their philosophical character.
Some different dimensions of emergence in this sense have been discussed. In the first
place, [Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2013] focussed on the conceptual gap between spacetime
and non-spatiotemporality. At one extreme, spacetime that is merely discrete is not con-
ceptually far from ordinary, continuous spacetime, and emergence may not even apply.
At the other, a theory whose basic elements are members of an algebra has a radically
non-spatiotemporal ontology. However, the formal difficulty of deriving spacetime does
not track such conceptual gaps. Or again, Oriti (in progress) has distinguished ‘levels’
of emergence in another way. At the lowest level are theories which do little more than
allow quantum superpositions of classical spacetime states. More interesting are theories
postulating non-spatiotemporal building blocks: if these are physical then we reach a low
level of emergence. When many such atoms are present, there may be different ‘phases’,
analogous to gas or condensed liquid states; if only some of the phases are ‘condensates’ in
which the blocks form spacetime, then we reach a higher level. The final level is reached if
both spatiotemporal and non-spatiotemporal phases are physical, and if there is a literal
transition between them – a process of ‘geometrogenesis’, identified with the big bang in
our phase of the universe. (The big conceptual question of course being how to make sense
of a transition from a non-temporal to a temporal state!) Our case study is an example of
such a theory.
It is important to note that using ‘emergence’ in any other than the central philosophical
sense has been criticized (see Crowther in preparation), at least on the grounds of sewing
confusion. In the remainder of this essay, I will attempt to finesse this issue by turning
attention to the question of ‘explaining’ spacetime. The qualitative gap between a funda-
mental theory without spacetime and a derived one with spacetime, will be seen to entail
an explanatory gap: whether or not we describe the filling of this gap as ‘emergence’, is
not pertinent to the rather general account that I give.
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In the remainder we will first (§2) turn to the general question of providing such a radical
explanation, like that of spacetime in terms of the non-spatiotemporal, and study the issues
in a historical analogue. Then (§3) we will study how the lessons apply in a concrete case
of QS. Finally, (§4) I will briefly mention some of the other issues that come up regarding
the topic of spacetime emergence, and some of the relevant literature.
2. Explaining Spacetime
Let’s suppose that we are faced with a (more) fundamental theory in which there are
(to a substantial extent) no spatiotemporal quantities: perhaps one of the examples above,
perhaps something as yet undiscovered. How, in general terms, could such a theory explain
the appearance of (relativistic) spacetime? Well, the answer in similar cases is of course
that the apparent, higher level quantities and ‘structures’ (generally speaking) have to be
derived from the fundamental, lower level ones. For instance, in the kinetic gas model,
thermodynamical quantities like temperature and pressure are (approximately) identified
with the mean kinetic energy of and momentum transfer from atoms of gas; and then
the thermodynamical law of proportionality between pressure and temperature (at fixed
volume) is derived from the laws of elastic collision. From the fundamental theory in
which temperature and pressure are not basic quantities, are derived those thermodynamic
quantities and their relations. Even though the gulf between theories with and without
spacetime is a (far) larger one, the same basic model should apply to emergent spacetime:
some suitable spatiotemporal quantities will have to be derived from non-spatiotemporal
ones.
As Maudlin puts it2, “one might [try to] derive a physical structure with the form of
[spacetime quantities] from a basic ontology that does not postulate them. This would
allow the theory to make contact with evidence still at the level of [spacetime quantities],
but would also insist that, at a fundamental level, the local structure is not itself primitive.”
However, he points out that ‘derivation’ is ambiguous here, and that its weakest form will
not really do. “This approach turns critically on what such a derivation of something
isomorphic to local structure would look like, where the derived structure deserves to be
regarded as physically salient (rather than merely mathematically definable). Until we know
how to identify physically serious derivative structure, it is not clear how to implement this
strategy.” ([Maudlin, 2007, 3157]: my emphasis.)
The purpose of this section is to unpack the general notion of a ‘physically salient deriva-
tion’, its meaning, nature, and grounds – and differentiate it from merely mathematical
derivation. Such work is preliminary to understanding the special problem of physical
salience for the emergence of spacetime, and how one should expect it to be resolved; that
question is addressed in the next section, in a case study. We will start with an instructive
historical example.
2Admittedly in a different context: that of the derivation of 3-dimensional space from 3N -dimensional
configuration space. However, the same points apply to our situation. (He also uses ‘local beables’ where I
have inserted ‘spacetime quantities’.)
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In his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes proposed that all physical processes were
ultimately to be understood in terms of the arrangement, motions, and collisions – contact
action – of particles of matter. This is the basic principle of the ‘mechanical philosophy’,
whose proponents contrasted it with Aristotelian or scholastic teleological science, in which
even physical processes are explained by tendencies or ‘occult powers’, driving systems to
end states. For example, Aristotle explained (i) terrestrial gravity in terms of a tendency
of certain elements towards their natural place at the centre of the universe, and (ii) the
motions of the planets in terms of the natural tendency of heavenly matter (aether or
quintessence) to rotate about that centre. Descartes of course rejected such accounts:
according to him (i) terrestrial gravity was the result of the greater centrifugal ‘force’ on
light matter than on dense matter, while (ii) the planets were carried by huge vortices of
fine matter rotating around the sun.
The theory of universal gravity developed by Newton (cross-reference) in his Mathe-
matical Principles of Natural Philosophy does not offer such a mechanical account at all:
instead a law is derived which ascribes a force between every pair of bodies in the universe,
proportional to their masses, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance be-
tween them. (i) Newton demonstrates that the aggregate gravitational effect on external
bodies, of individual parts of matter arranged in a homogeneous sphere, is the same as if
all the mass were concentrated at the centre of mass. Terrestrial weight is then explained
by the attraction that the earth exerts on the matter in bodies. (ii) Regarding the planets,
treated as point bodies because of their small size compared to interplanetary distances,
Kepler’s laws (up to corrections due to the mobility of the sun, and the mutual gravita-
tional interactions) can then be derived from the laws of mechanics and gravity. (This
example will serve as our archetype of a derivation below.)
Famously, in his Principles Newton ‘feigns no hypothesis’ – by which he means me-
chanical account – about the nature of gravity (though in his Optiks and elsewhere he
critically considers such proposals). But it is not hard to see that a mechanical account of
Newtonian gravity is hard to come by: its universality entails that bodies at opposite ends
of the universe exert equal forces on each other, so somehow collisions with the matter
surrounding each body would have to be correlated. Thus the response of the mechanists
to Newton was to accept the predictive accuracy of the inverse square law for the solar
planets (given the precision and fertility of the law, they had little choice), but to deny
its universality, as defying mechanical explanation. For them, accepting a non-mechanical
attraction would be nothing less than reintroducing a banished occult power.
For example, as well as attempting a mechanical account in his Tentamen, Leibniz
actively engaged with the Newtonians (and hence by proxy Newton) on just this issue.
In the third letter of his Correspondence with Clarke he writes: “If God would cause a
body to move [round a] fixed centre, without any [body] acting upon it . . . it cannot be
explained by the nature of bodies. For, a free body does naturally recede from a curve in
the tangent. And therefore . . . the attraction of bodies . . . is a miraculous thing, since it
cannot be explained by the nature of bodies.” ([Alexander, 1998]) The point could not be
clearer: according to the mechanical philosophy, physically only a collision with another
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body can explain a deviation from linear, inertial motion, so attraction at a distance would
be unphysical, or miraculous in the contemporary idiom.3
In Maudlin’s terms, Leibniz claims that the Newtonian theory of universal gravity allows
the ‘mere mathematical derivation’ of the observed system of motions of the planets, but
that derivation is not ‘physically salient’ because it violates the mechanical principle. Put
yet another way, an instrumentally valid, predictively accurate, theory might fail to deliver
physical explanations, because it fails to satisfy the principles (in a broad sense) of how
more fundamental physical elements can combine to produce less fundamental structures:
‘principles of physical salience’, we can say. In Leibniz’s case the principle is explicit, but
in general such principles are shown to exist by the possibility of taking this or that theory
merely instrumentally (as opposed to blanket instrumentalism): accepting its claims about
the observable, but denying the further claim that the observable is the literal ‘product’
of unobservable elements described by the theory. Other examples include the principle
that macroscopic structures should be co-located with their constituents, Hamilton’s prin-
ciple, (local) gauge principle, renormalizability principle, null energy condition; as well as
other more ‘homely’ principles about the application of theory to derive concrete observ-
able consequences. If these are not (among the jointly) sufficient conditions for physical
explanation then many familiar derivations are nothing but mathematics, and no reflection
of an underlying physical story.
Of course, historically the failure of the Cartesians to produce a mechanical explanation
(or contrary empirical evidence) led ultimately to the acceptance of Newtonian action-at-a-
distance as physically explanatory, as part of physically salient derivations. (The difference
from Aristotelian powers being that only a small number of fundamental forces are admit-
ted; they are not proposed ad hoc whenever one wants to explain a new phenomenon.) As
Newton himself suggested, F = ma can be understood as a schema for the action of such
fundamental forces. But, equally of course, subsequent developments swung the pendulum
back, if not in favor of contact action between bodies, in favor of local action: the work
of Faraday and Maxwell revealed the electromagnetic field to act according to local differ-
ential equations, and for its effects to propagate at the speed of light (in accordance with
special relativity). Application of the local field principle to gravity led Einstein to general
relativity, in which gravity does not act a distance, but instead propagates locally as a field.
However, the development of quantum mechanics then swung the pendulum again, since it
allows effects not easily understood in terms of the local propagation of fields in spacetime:
entanglement, and the Bohm-Aharanov effect, for instance (cross-reference). While the
‘pendulum’ does not strictly move in a plane, the oscillation between some kind of local
action, and some kind of non-local action as permissible in physically salient derivations is
clear enough – as is the centrality of principles concerning (non-)locality to the development
of physics.4
3Emphasizing this line of thought in Leibniz is somewhat misleading. More generally he sought to
reconcile and Aristotelian metaphysics with mechanical physics.
4[Hesse, 1961] tells the tale in far more detail.
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I have told this story at some length, even though it does not directly concern the
emergence of spacetime, because it offers a familiar template for an entirely unfamiliar
situation. I draw an explicit parallel between the problems of physical explanation without
the collisions of bodies, and without spacetime. As the former once seemed an a priori
condition on physics, so can the latter today; indeed most, if not all, principles of physical
salience presuppose classical spacetime in some way – consider the list given above. And
if we understand how the former was replaced, we can understand how the latter may be
too. We can, that is, understand how derived spacetime structures might come to ‘deserve
to be regarded as physically salient’. Specifically, considering the case of locality, we see
the following.
First, the criteria for a formal derivation to be physically salient are theory dependent;
we saw quite dramatically the changing status of locality principles. (While this idea that
there are such ‘standards’ of acceptable explanation can be found in [Kuhn, 1962], we need
not draw the conclusions of scientific irrationality often attributed to him.)
Second, such principles are interwoven with our understanding of the theoretical content
of the theory, the nature of its objects and structures; indeed, one could say that accepting
principles of physical explanation is part of accepting an interpretation of a theory. So for
instance, the principle of contact action is intimately connected with Descartes’ account
of space and matter, and his critique of Aristotelian powers, while similar stories hold of
other principles. In short they are part of the conceptual, or philosophical background
of a theory, dubbed the ‘relative a priori’ by [Friedman, 2001], who offers a historically
informed account of its development in various cases.5
Third, although the principles are thereby distanced from direct test, their ultimate
epistemic warrant is empirical: the overall success of the theory in explaining and predict-
ing phenomena. There is a vast literature on the question of the nature and epistemic
authority of ‘empirical success’; of when and whether empirical evidence warrants belief
in ‘theoretical’ claims and explanations. So I will not elaborate on this contentious notion
here, except to say that it is assumed here that there is a difference between taking an
instrumentalist attitude to a theory and a more realist one.6 However, it should not be
the case that just any formal derivations from a successful theory are explanatory; not just
anything can be a principle of physical salience. Philosophical analyses of theory change
(like Kuhn’s and Friedman’s) address the question of how new principles are decided on,
and so to what more general criteria they are answerable; again, I will largely defer to this
5I use ‘principles’, but that term is potentially misleading, for it suggests an explicit, finite list of
statements. Realistically, the rules that physicists adopt for permitted derivations are often implicit; they
also amount to practical knowledge, so it is controversial whether they could even be codified in principle.
6In fact, it seems to me that parallel points about physical salience can be made by anti-realists, so
even they should find this article of interest. First, constructive empiricists, like van Fraassen, while not
committed to the truth of a theory, are committed to understanding its claims literally – so the question
of what physical explanations they propose still seems apt, even if they remain agnostic about its truth.
Second, I do not think that even a narrowly positivistic view of theory can rest merely on strict mathematical
derivation to understand scientific explanation. At least, a theory is supplemented with rules about what
patterns of derivation, and what idealizations and approximations, are permitted. Positivists might view
principles of physical salience as such rules.
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literature. But for instance, the principles must be internally coherent, and systematize
explanations within the theory, and they must also mesh with an accurate account of the
relevant empirical data. (What they need not do is fit any psychologically comfortable,
familiar picture.) So the philosophical aspect of developing a relative a priori is inher-
ently critical, questioning whether existing or putative new principles in fact satisfy such
broader criteria; it is not a matter of simply spinning a story around mathematics. Classic
examples of this critical project include Newton’s analysis of absolute and relative space,
Poincare´’s analysis of non-Euclidean physical geometry, and of course Einstein’s analysis
of space, time and motion.
Fourthly, as Friedman again emphasizes, theories are not born as fully formed for-
malisms, simply awaiting principles of physical explanation, but rather formalism and in-
terpretation are generally constructed simultaneously, each guiding the other in the search
for a more fundamental account of the phenomena. Hence the philosophical project of
articulating a relative a priori is carried out in tandem with the more formal project of
providing a mathematical system; here Einstein (and his precursors’) development and
articulation of relativity is a paradigm.
Putting these four points together then, knowing how to ‘identify physically serious
derivative structure’ is one of the things discovered during the development of a new theory
(if it is a radical departure from previous theory), and like the rest of theory in order to
account for phenomena, and not by reasoning of an absolute a priori kind. Therefore, in
the search for a theory in which existing principles of physical salience are inapplicable
because there are no fundamental spacetime structures, we should expect to find new
principles being proposed which will permit the physical explanation of empirical spacetime
structures. Making explicit, analyzing, and critiquing such proposals is a philosophical
activity of the first order. In the following section we will see these points realized in a
concrete case.
3. Case Study: The Emergence of Spacetime in Group Field Theory
Our case study is ‘Group Field Theory’ (GFT)7. A group generalizes the idea of geometric
transformations, and specifically the pattern in which they combine: in the simplest case,
clockwise rotations in the plane, a rotation of θo followed by a rotation of φo degrees equals
a rotation of (θ+φ)o, while a rotation of (360− θ)o will undo a rotation of θo. Abstracting
away, a group is any collection of elements with an (associative) rule that maps any two
into a third, and such that every element has an inverse, with which it maps to a special
neutral element (the identity if the elements are in fact transformations). From the group
point of view, the nature of the group elements is not the key thing, but simply which pairs
are mapped onto which elements: the group algebra. For example, any group in which the
elements map in the same way as planar rotations have the group algebra SO(2).
In familiar cases, a physical field is a continuous distribution of some property – tem-
perature, gravitational or electromagnetic potential, say – over spacetime; we represent
7The following is based on [Gielen et al., 2013, Oriti, 2014]. Note that GFT is a way of ‘second quan-
tizing’ loop quantum gravity, in which chunks of spacetime ‘foam’ are created and annihilated.
SPACETIME ‘EMERGENCE’ 9
such a system by a function from points to mathematical quantities of some kind. GFT
generalizes this conception, and considers a field that lives on the elements of a group;
for instance, a map from the elements of SO(2) to complex numbers. It is important in
this picture not to think of the group elements as literal rotations in some plane of space,
but rather as primitive points of some new ‘space’, related just like the rotations; having
this understanding is the point of our discussion of abstracting away from literal rotations.
Indeed, the elements of SO(2) form a circle, labelled by 0 ≤ θ < 360, not a 2-dimensional
plane at all. The question is how to derive ordinary space from such a group space.
The GFT that permits such a derivation utilizes the group SO(1, 3) of Lorentz trans-
formations – again abstracting, to view the group elements as primitive points, not lit-
eral transformations, but structured just like them. (NB: these transformations act on
4-dimensional spacetime, but themselves form a 6-dimensional ‘space’, since they include
both translations and boosts in three spatial directions.) Because we want to recover
a 4-dimensional spacetime there are four copies of SO(1, 3) (making a 24-dimensional
‘space’). The field is a map from quadruples of group elements to the complex numbers:
Φ(g1, g2, g3, g4) with gi ∈ SO(1, 3). Finally, the theory must be quantized (cross-reference).
Φ is replaced by a quantum operator Φˆ†, which ‘creates’ a quantum of the field: if |0〉 rep-
resents the vacuum state, then Φˆ†(g1, g2, g3, g4)|0〉 represents a state in which a single
quantum is present, at (g1, g2, g3, g4).
8
So much for the basic structure of the theory, but how is spacetime derived? And is the
derivation physically salient, or merely mathematical in the way we discussed previously.
To frame that investigation, we first extract a simple model of physical explanation from
our discussion of gravity.
Generally speaking, suppose that a less fundamental relation L says f(A) = g(B). For
example, Kepler’s laws can be framed this way, in terms of the positions (over time) of the
planets. Then, if (a) fundamental quantities X can be ‘aggregated’ into α(X) and β(X),
such that (b) f(α(X)) = g(β(X)) follows from fundamental laws, then L is mathematically
derived (or defined). For instance, the positions of the parts of a planet can be ‘aggregated’
to the center of mass, and then Kepler’s laws follow from Newton’s laws. (‘Aggregating’
is a deliberately broad concept: it could be summing, or averaging, or coarse-graining, or
something else. The point is that in general, fundamental degrees of freedom are typically
combined into fewer, effective degrees of freedom.)
Thus far, of course, the Cartesians were with Newton. His theory truly did allow an
empirically accurate, mathematical derivation of the phenomena. But they denied that
universal gravity physically explained them. So let us say that in addition, for physical
explanation, (c) α(X) and β(X) must be physically salient quantities in the sense explained
above. Because it violated the mechanical principle, Leibniz claimed that gravitational
attraction was not physically salient; although later physicists did accept it as such.
8It’s worth emphasizing that the full mathematical apparatus of modern physics, including the calculus,
applies in GFT; so one can proceed classically with an action, and in quantum mechanics with a path
integral. In that regard, things are as usual.
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Our goal is to sketch the derivation of spacetime in GFT, and ask what new understand-
ing of physical salience is required if we are to understand it not as purely formal, but as
a physical explanation: satisfying not just (a) and (b), but also (c).
It is helpful to picture a quantum of the group field, Φˆ†(g1, g2, g3, g4)|0〉 as a tetrahedron,
with the four faces ‘labelled’ with the four ‘coordinates’ of the point in group space: see
figure 1.
g1 g
2
g4
g3
Gij
V3V1 V2
Figure 1. A pictorial representation of a GFT quantum, Φˆ†(g1, g2, g3, g4)|0〉.
This representation immediately makes the quantum appear spatial, as a literal tetra-
hedron of space. Indeed, ultimately that interpretation will be used in the recovery of
spacetime, but at this stage one should simply think of it as nothing more than an alter-
native formalism for expressing the state Φˆ†(g1, g2, g3, g4)|0〉. No physical interpretation is
(yet) implied by this rewriting. Then, summarizing [Gielen et al., 2013]:
(1) Given some additional physical assumptions about the field, only three of the co-
ordinates are independent, determining the fourth. Given the group, in turn each
of the three can be specified by a 4-component quantity: gi is specified by the four
numbers aµi (i = 1, 2, 3, µ = 0, 1, 2, 3).
(2) If – and I stress the hypothetical nature of this statement – the corresponding
tetrahedron were embedded in space, then (given appropriate symmetries) the aµi
determine vectors
−→
Vi , defining the three edges of the tetrahedron, leading from one
vertex, located at a spatial point p: see figure 1. Linear combinations of them,
−→v =∑i ci−→Vi can be interpreted as other spatial vectors.
(3) Next, a symmetric 3×3 matrix, can be defined at p by Gij(p) ≡
∑
µ aiµa
µ
j .This can
be used to define the ‘dot product’ of any two spatial vectors at p, −→u = ∑i ci−→Vi
and −→v = ∑i di−→Vi , according to −→u · −→v ≡ ∑ij Gij(p)cidj . In other words, if the
tetrahedron were thought of as living in space, then the GFT quantum would define
a tiny piece of geometry for that space; a ‘metric’, which determines the lengths of
and angles between vectors in space (cross-reference).
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(4) Finally, suppose space were evenly filled with many such tetrahedra, such that the
metric Gij was homogeneous, the same everywhere. (Suppose that we measure
distances with a ruler whose smallest gradations are millions of times bigger than
the side of a tetrahedron, so that we cannot see that the metric is only given at
discrete points.) [Gielen et al., 2013] proved mathematically that then the field
must be in a particular ‘coherent state’. Such a state is a quantum superposition
of every number of quanta: a superposition of one quantum, and two quanta, and
. . . .9
The above (in its full detail) constitutes a mathematical definition of structure isomor-
phic to ordinary space: a collection of GFT quanta, represented as tetrahedra of space,
and defining a metric as described, demonstrably yield a homogeneous space. In terms
of our analytical framework, (a) defining the metric, positing space-filling tetrahedra, and
taking the coherent state amount to aggregating the fundamental GFT degrees of freedom,
while (b) the proof that the result is a well-defined homogeneous metric shows that the
fundamental GFT laws entail that the desired less-fundamental relation holds. (In fact,
things are much better even: spacetime geometry dynamics can also be derived, including
Robertson-Walker metrics. But we will focus on space for simplicity.)
But of course, as far as physical explanation goes, there is a lacuna: why should ex-
citations of a quantum field over a space whose points are group elements manifest as
chunks of physical space? They may be isomorphic in some way (in some states) but that
does not make them literally spatial, any more than (say) the numbers [0, 1] are space,
even if they are identically structured. In particular, to constitute space the chunks must
manifest themselves evenly across a macroscopic volume, rather than a microscopic region,
or in disconnected islands, or observably far apart. Nothing in the basic theory dictates
the distribution, but it (and more) is required if the defined GFT structure deserve to be
regarded as physically salient, satisfying (c). The question arises because no spatial prin-
ciples guide the explanation. GFT quanta fundamentally live ‘in’ the group space, not in
ordinary space at all; at (g1, g2, g3, g4) not at (x, y, z), so it seems a category error to even
ask how they are co-located with spatial regions. Similarly, since there are two spaces,
ordinary space and the group, notions of local or non-local action of quanta don’t even
apply – they refer to events in a single space. Just as we expected, when we seek to derive
ordinary space in terms of a theory that does not posit it, existing principles of physical
salience do not permit physical explanation. There is an explanatory gap.
As we saw in connection with universal gravity, such explanatory gaps are theory-
relative, and new empirically successful theories come with principles of physical salience
to fill them – when we accept the theory as something more than a successful instrument.
Of course, we also saw that discovering such principles is a critical philosophical project,
carried out simultaneously with the mathematical articulation of the theory. So we should
9They are also the most classical states of any quantum system, simultaneously minimizing position
and momentum while respecting the Heisenberg uncertainty relations. Moreover, they are unitarily in-
equivalent to non-coherent states, strongly suggesting that there is a phase transition to such states: the
geometrogenesis mentioned above. [Oriti, 2014]
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not expect at this stage in the development of GFT to have a definitive statement of the
principles; rather one should engage with the developing formal theory, to help critically
articulate them.
For example, a first stab at the principle that would let us view the GFT derivation as
a physical explanation is that ‘quanta occupy tetrahedra of space’. But that can’t be right
for a number of reasons: the theory does not presuppose space, space is an appearance,
so the tetrahedra constitute rather than occupy volumes; then we don’t have space until
there are many quanta, enough to compose a large volume; indeed, there is formal evidence
that the quanta only make ordinary space in coherent states.10 So even this short critical
conceptual analysis leads us to a better proposal: ‘in a coherent state, quanta constitute
evenly spread tetrahedral chunks of what appears empirically as space’. Even that is only
an illustration of the project that I have described; the ultimate correctness of this proposal
depends on further development of the formal and conceptual aspects of GFT.
Finally, we should never forget that any such development ultimately stands or falls
on the empirical success of the theory, and that at this stage it is far too early to claim
definitive empirical success for any theory of quantum gravity. But as I argued, that is not
a reason to refrain from philosophical analysis, for the formal and philosophical aspects
need to be developed together, with hope for empirical success down the road. However,
it does mean that one must view any philosophical conclusions as hypothetical: holding
only on condition that the theory is vindicated. Philosophers might desire more, but that
is not possible in scientific enquiry.
4. Further Exploration
This essay has focused on the general philosophical project (itself an aspect of a scientific
project) of understanding the ‘emergence’ of spacetime, how something apparently so basic
to physics could have a physical explanation. In this final section I will give a partial list
of works that either deal with specific cases, or develop other philosophical questions. In
addition to papers mentioned, a store of video lectures and classes on the topic can be
found at www.beyondspacetime.net.
4.1. Investigations of specific theories of QS. As mentioned the two core reviews of
putative cases of spacetime emergence are [Seiberg, 2006] and [Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2013];
the former from a physics point of view, and the latter from a more philosophical one (the
special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics in which it appears
contains several other papers of interest, some listed here). More specific works include:
(1) String Theory : (cross-reference) gives an introduction. [Teh, 2013] discusses (nega-
tively) whether the appearance of extra spatial dimensions in the bulk spacetime in
AdS/CFT duality is a case of emergence. [Huggett and Vistarini, 2015] investigate
the derivation of the field equations of GR in string theory, while [Huggett, 2015]
argues that dualities imply that string theory does not include ordinary spacetime
in its fundamental structures.
10With perturbative quantum corrections.
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(2) Loop Quantum Gravity : (cross-reference) gives an introduction, while
[Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2018] will have a more detailed analysis. [Rovelli, 1998] is
also recommended.
(3) Geometrogenesis: a number of ideas concerning spacetime emergence, and espe-
cially that of ‘geometrogenesis’ discussed above are developed in [Oriti, 2014].
(4) Causal Set Theory : CST claims that spacetime grows one discrete point at a time;
it is sometimes claimed that this picture entails a notion of temporal becoming,
often thought missing from relativity. [Huggett, 2014] argues that such a view
requires two times; that in which points are created, and that which they consti-
tute. [Wu¨thrich and Callender, 2016] investigate this kind of picture critically, but
suggesting a way in which it might be developed.
(5) Other Approaches: [Lizzi, 2009] provides a nice introduction to non-commutative
geometry, with some interesting remarks on the interpretation of the formalism.
[Bain, 2013] investigates approaches to QG based on ideas from condensed mat-
ter physics. Shape dynamics has received little attention from philosophers, but
[Barbour, 2012] contains a philosophically aware introduction.
This list is partial; in particular there are a number of other proposals for QS in the
physics literature. The essay collections [Callender and Huggett, 2001], [Oriti, 2009], and
[Rickles et al., 2006] contain numerous useful essays explaining different approaches, and
in many cases discussing how spacetime is derived.
4.2. Metaphysical Implications. The implications of emergent spacetime for traditional
metaphysical views are only starting to be explored – but given that so many are tied to a
classical conception of spacetime, it should be expected that there is a great deal to learn.
For example, Alastair Wilson has asked (in his talks) exactly how one should distinguish
grounding from causation, especially in cases in which there is no spacetime: after all,
traditional accounts of causation are deeply tied to spacetime. And again, Vistarini (in
progress) and Wu¨thrich (in progress) have noted that Lewis’ account of possible worlds
assumes that they are spatiotemporal, and in different ways explore possible consequences.
Another important strand of enquiry that philosophers have taken up concerns the way
in which ordinary spacetime might be grounded in the non-spatiotemporal. In particular,
there are two recent proposals that go by the name ‘spacetime functionalism’, though they
differ in motivation and content.11 On the one hand, [Knox, 2013] (although it doesn’t
explicitly use the term) has the interpretation of physical theory in mind, and proposes
in very loose terms that spacetime is what plays the role of determining inertial trajecto-
ries: then, for example, she argues that for Newtonian gravity, Newton-Cartan spacetime
plays that role, not Newtonian spacetime. On the other, [Chalmers, 2012, §7.5] has a
neo-Carnapian constructive project: he leans to the view that spacetime concepts (such as
shape or length) refer to whatever structures produce their typical spatiotemporal experi-
ences. It’s hard to bring the two functionalisms into close comparison, because Chalmers’ is
11Note that the functionalism here is not necessarily of the classic kind, in which entities sharing all
and only the same causal powers are identified: e.g., [Lewis, 1972]. Rather some more general variational
co-dependency is meant; after all, in QS causality may not apply at all.
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a view about ordinary concepts, while Knox’s concerns a theoretical object. Nevertheless,
Yates (in progress) suggests that they differ according to whether ‘spacetime’ will turn out
to be anything like ordinary spacetime. According to Knox’s account, even if fundamental
physics is non-spatiotemporal, there may be some derived structure – presumably rela-
tivistic spacetime – that plays the appropriate role. However, Yates argues, if fundamental
physics is ultimately what produces spatiotemporal experiences, then that will turn out
to be the referent of ‘spacetime’ for Chalmers, even if it is not spatiotemporal in any way
familiar spacetimes are: much as water might not be H2O on Twin Earth.
These and other metaphysical matters are of ongoing attention as I write.
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